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Abstract—In electrical distribution grids, the constantly in-
creasing number of power generation devices based on renew-
ables demands a transition from a centralized to a distributed
generation paradigm. In fact, power injection from Distributed
Energy Resources (DERs) can be selectively controlled to achieve
other objectives beyond supporting loads, such as the minimiza-
tion of the power losses along the distribution lines and the
subsequent increase of the grid hosting capacity. However, these
technical achievements are only possible if alongside electrical
optimization schemes, a suitable market model is set up to pro-
mote cooperation from the end users. In contrast with the existing
literature, where energy trading and electrical optimization of
the grid are often treated separately or the trading strategy
is tailored to a specific electrical optimization objective, in this
work we consider their joint optimization. We also allow for a
modular approach, where the market model can support any
smart grid optimization goal. Specifically, we present a multi-
objective optimization problem accounting for energy trading,
where: 1) DERs try to maximize their profit, resulting from
selling their surplus energy, 2) the loads try to minimize their
expense, and 3) the main power supplier aims at maximizing
the electrical grid efficiency through a suitable discount policy.
This optimization problem is proved to be non convex, and an
equivalent convex formulation is derived. Centralized solutions
are discussed first, and are subsequently distributed transforming
the optimization problem into an equivalent one that can be
efficiently solved through the alternating direction method of
multipliers. Numerical results to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the so obtained optimal policies are then presented, showing
the proposed model results in economic benefits for all the users
(generators and loads) and in an increased electrical efficiency
for the grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional power grids, two main challenges are emerg-
ing: increasing power demand, and uncoordinated injection
of electrical power from distributed generators. On the one
hand, the constantly increasing power demand calls for radical
changes on how the energy is generated and delivered to the
final users. On the other hand, the uncoordinated injection of
electrical power from distributed generators based on renew-
ables [1], [2] tends to destabilize the power network, possibly
leading to outages.
To address these problems, recent work has shown that
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) can be effectively used
to boost the grid efficiency [3]–[7]. This research work has
resulted in the proposal of several grid optimization tech-
niques [8]–[10], each exploiting some existing communication
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infrastructure and relying on online smart metering proce-
dures [11]. A common trait of these techniques is that a
coordinated and intelligent control of the distributed generation
capabilities (from renewables) holds the potential of enhancing
the electrical grid performance, ameliorating the aforemen-
tioned problems and, at the same time, increasing the grid
hosting capacity.
In this paper, we target residential micro grids where some
of the end-users behave as DERs, through the exploitation of
renewable energy such as solar, wind, biomass, geothermal,
etc. In these micro grids, each DER is normally equipped with
an energy storage device (i.e., a battery) and it is assumed to
fulfill its own power demand. In addition, during each network
cycle, DERs can independently decide to either sell part of the
stored energy to the main power supplier, which is addressed
as the Point of Common Coupling (PCC), or directly to some
selected end-users (loads). Without any further regulation,
DERs would sell all their energy to the agents ensuring the
highest revenue. However, this could lead to inefficient operat-
ing points for the grid (e.g., high distribution power losses or
instability problems). Control techniques for DERs [12]–[16]
can prevent this, by significantly reducing distribution power
losses, relieving the PCC from some of the power load and
granting stability. According to these strategies, after local load
satisfaction, end-users fine tune their energy injection into the
electricity grid so as to reduce the distribution power losses
and the total power demand from the mains.
Nevertheless, previous control studies for electrical power
grids ignore that, in real-world scenarios, DERs energy in-
jection’s attitude depends on economic advantages. Thus,
previous approaches may not be viable in practice if not
paired with suitable market rules. New market models for
the smart grid have been studied so far in terms of demand-
response control and dynamic pricing strategies. Some work
addressed the case where a single energy provider determines
the best real time pricing policy, maximizing its own economic
benefit [17], [18] or a specific quality of service function
accounting for the main supplier revenue and the aggregated
end-users experience [19], [20]. Other papers exploit dynamic
pricing policies to control the power demand from end-users,
thus reducing the chance of instability events as, for example,
power outages [21], [22]. Moreover, effort has been devoted to
the definition of pricing models that enforce the efficiency of
specific electrical optimization techniques, see, for example,
[23]–[25]. Here, we recognize that real users are expected
to change their behavior and positively contribute to the grid
optimization if this leads to economic benefits (i.e., a monetary
income). Moreover, we note that several electrical optimization
techniques may already be deployed in the same micro grid,
2such as, peak shaving [26] or power loss minimization [27].
Thus, we propose an optimization framework that jointly
accounts for economic rewards (i.e., lowering the energy con-
sumers expenses and guaranteeing higher profit to the DERs)
and for the execution of a selected electrical optimization
technique (so to increase the energy efficiency of the power
grid and assure its stability). The proposed framework defines
a market model that can be optimized to support any combi-
nation of electrical optimization techniques, as long as they
determine the amount of power that each DER has to inject
at any given time. Also, as we discuss below, the proposed
model does not require that preexisting contract terms and
conditions for the electric supply are renegotiated. Hence, the
approach can be readily deployed with minimal modifications
to existing grids/regulations. Although we are aware that in
current markets DERs sell their surplus energy to the PCC
(i.e., direct selling to distributed users is not permitted), we
assume that energy trading among end-users will be allowed
in the future and we disregard regulatory restrictions. In fact,
current research trends are promoting distributed architectures
where end users trade energy in a peer-to-peer fashion [28],
as we do here.
The proposed market scenario is naturally formulated as
a multi-objective optimization problem. Each grid user (i.e.,
loads, DERs, and the PCC) is assumed to act as a rational
agent and, in turn, it always tries to maximize its own benefit.
Hence, each DER maximizes its own profit, each load mini-
mizes its own expense and the PCC aims at assuring the grid’s
electrical efficiency. Energy can be traded directly among end-
users (i.e., DERs and loads) or between end-users and the
PCC. In this paper, after formally defining the optimization
problem, its centralized solution is presented. In this case, the
PCC acts as a central controller and regulator for the grid. This
solution provides a complete description of the Pareto-optimal
(P-optimal) trading strategy (i.e., energy prices, and energy
allocation matrix) for each grid agent. In this centralized
case, the PCC solves the problem and then distributes the P-
optimal parameters to the network agents. Since the solution
is guaranteed to provide economic benefit to all the DERs and
loads, it is in their best interest to adopt the P-optimal trading
strategy. In particular, each DER receives from the PCC the
energy prices that such a DER should apply and the amount
of energy it should sell to each load in the same grid. The
loads can then decide whether to buy energy from the DERs
(according to the proposed prices) or from the PCC (according
to a fixed common price). The PCC enforces the grid electrical
efficiency by applying a discount policy to the price paid by
the loads when buying from DERs. After characterizing the
centralized solution, we present a distributed formulation of
the problem. This is achieved through a transformation of the
original problem into an equivalent one, which is shaped as
a general form consensus with regularization [29]. This new
problem can be efficiently solved in a decentralized manner
using the alternating direction method of multipliers [29].
We seek for a P-optimal policy that provides the best trading
strategy (in terms of economic benefit) for each end-user,
while also driving the system toward the best electrical condi-
tion (according to a selected grid optimization technique). We
remark that the proposed model is transparent to the chosen
G2L2 L1 G1
PCCB4 B3 B1 B2
Fig. 1: Electrical network example, where Bi, i = 1, . . . , 4
are the electrical distribution lines, Lj , j = 1, 2 are the loads,
Gk, k = 1, 2 are the DERs, and the PCC is the Point of
Common Coupling.
grid optimization strategy. In fact, any electrical optimization
technique can be plugged into our framework as long as it
provides an optimal power allocation for the nodes. Hence
the applicability of our model does not reduce to a single
scenario and it does not exclude future improvements in terms
of electrical optimization. Moreover, we allow the PCC (i.e.,
the electrical utility) to set the importance of each performance
objective, i.e., end-user revenue vs grid electrical efficiency.
This is achieved by means of a maximum discount factor that
limits the individual discount that can be applied in the energy
trading between DERs and loads.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the considered electrical / market scenarios and two
use cases for the proposed optimization framework. Section III
presents the mathematical notation for the market model, the
associated multi-objective optimization problem, its discussion
and solution. In this section, we first show that the considered
optimization problem is non-convex. Thus, a bijective trans-
formation yielding a convex version of the original problem
is found and the solution of the new convex problem is
assessed. Finally, a decentralized approach based on ADMM
is proposed. In Section IV, the electrical grid topology and the
parameters used to obtain the numerical results are given. In
Section V, the numerical results obtained through the setup
of Section IV are shown. Finally, in Section VI, we draw
the conclusions of our work and discuss the validity of the
proposed model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND USE CASES
In this section, the electrical, communication and market
scenarios are introduced. Some relevant use cases are de-
scribed, showing how two electrical optimization techniques
from the literature can be plugged into the proposed optimiza-
tion framework. In particular, we define the communication
requirements and infrastructure needed to support the proposed
model and discuss the interactions among the involved (ratio-
nal) agents.
A. Electrical Scenario
We consider a steady-state1 low voltage power micro grid.
For ease of computation, and without loss of generality, the
considered grid is modeled as a directed tree. The root of
the tree represents the Point of Common Coupling (PCC)
and the other nodes represent loads and Distributed Energy
1In steady-state, the network has reached equilibrium and transient phe-
nomena are no longer relevant.
3Resources (DERs). Loads are either modeled by constant
complex impedances or by constant current sources, the PCC
is modeled as a voltage generator setting the voltage and
phase references for the entire grid, while DERs are modeled
either as power or current generators. Here, we assume that
the PCC is always able to supply the grid with the needed
power. Hence, no power outages or voltage instabilities (i.e.,
overvoltages and voltage sags due to the DERs operations)
can occur in the considered electrical setup. This model has
been widely considered in the literature, and in particular for
power loss minimization algorithms [15], [16], [30]–[32].
Fig. 1 shows an example power grid is shown. DER i = 1, 2
and load j = 1, 2 are respectively denoted by Gi and Lj .
Distribution lines are assumed to have a constant section [15],
[16], and hence each line has a constant impedance per unit
length. The length of the z-th distribution line is denoted
by Bz . Each DER is equipped with a finite-size energy
storage device (e.g., rechargeable battery). The size of the
energy storage devices determines the total amount of available
power. Moreover, each DER is assumed to be feeding an
associated load and to have the capability of injecting part
of its energy surplus into the grid. The surplus power that
DER Gi can inject into the grid is denoted by Ei. For the
sake of terminology, the quantity Ei will be referred to as
Gi’s surplus energy. The amount of energy Ei that each DER
wishes to inject into the grid is not regulated by a central
authority, but it depends on his local decision. This decision,
in turn, depends on the specific energy storage policy that each
DER implements, as, for example, the minimization of the
probability of not being able to feed its associated load within
a given time horizon. In this paper, it is assumed, without
loss of generality, that Ei ≥ 0 ∀ i. Each load Lj is assumed
to have a non-negative power demand, which is denoted by
Dj ≥ 0. These assumptions are common in the literature, see
for example [14], [16], [26], [30].
B. Communication Scenario
Each node (i.e., loads, DERs and the PCC) in the grid
is equipped with a transceiver, whose communication perfor-
mance depends on the requirements of the selected electrical
optimization technique. These details are however neither con-
sidered here nor fundamental to the solution of the presented
optimization problem. In fact, our optimization framework is
independent of the specific communication technology and
infrastructure, as long as these allow a timely bi-directional
communication between each pair of nodes.
C. Market Scenario
We propose a market scenario where each DER can either
sell its surplus power to the PCC or directly to the loads.
The monetary revenue that each DER obtains by selling (part
of) its energy to the PCC is determined by a PCC-imposed
unitary buying price. The monetary revenue that each DER
obtains by selling its energy directly to a specific load is
determined by a DER-imposed unitary selling price. Each
DER can independently set a different selling price for each
load, i.e., this price is not controlled by the PCC. Also, each
load can fulfill its power demand by buying the needed power
Micro Grid
...
PCC buying price: γPCCi PCC selling price: pi
PCC
j
Discount: sj,i
Energy price: pi,j
PCC
Gi
DER i Load j
Lj
Fig. 2: Market scenario example. Here, the PCC can buy
energy from DER Gi paying unitary price γ
PCC
i , and it can
sell energy to load Lj for a unitary price pi
PCC
j . Moreover, Lj
can buy energy from Gi paying a discounted unitary price
pi,j − sj,i, where the discount sj,i is imposed by the PCC.
from the PCC or directly from the DERs. DERs and loads
are assumed to behave as rational agents. That is, each DER
will sell its power to the agents (PCC and loads) ensuring the
highest revenue, while each load will buy the power it needs
from the agents (PCC and DERs) ensuring the lowest expense.
Note that this trading model is consistent with the expected
evolution of the smart grid market [28].
Fig. 2 shows an example for the considered market scenario.
On the one hand, for each DER Gi, the PCC determines the
unitary price γPCCi . This is the unitary price that the PCC pays
when buying power from DER Gi. On the other hand, for each
load Lj the PCC determines the unitary price pi
PCC
j . This is
the unitary price that load Lj pays when buying power from
the PCC. The prices γPCCi and pi
PCC
j do not depend on the
optimization process. They are imposed by the PCC according
to existing energy trading contracts. Each network agent may
have different contract terms and conditions for buying and
selling energy from and to the PCC. These conditions set the
baseline for the proposed optimization to determine the new
trading strategy. With respect to the current practice, where
each DER sells Ei energy to the PCC for γ
PCC
i revenue and
each load buys Dj energy from the PCC spending pi
PCC
j Dj ,
the new trading strategy results in economic benefits for the
network agents, while also enforcing the electric optimization
policy already in place. In the proposed market model, each
DER Gi proposes a unitary price pi,j to each load Lj . The
unitary price pi,j determines the monetary revenue that Gi
obtains when selling power to Lj . In order to move the grid
electrical state toward the optimal solution (dictated by the
selected electrical grid optimization technique), the PCC can
apply a discount to the unitary prices pi,j proposed by the
DERs to the loads. The discount proposed by the PCC to
Lj when buying from Gi is denoted by sj,i and, in turn,
the unitary price that Lj pays to Gi is pi,j − sj,i. Similar
interaction models have been previously used in the scientific
literature see, e.g., [33]. We remark that, since DERs and
loads are assumed to be rational agents, any energy trading
4solution resulting in higher revenues for the DERs and in lower
expenses for the loads with respect to the current practice
will be embraced. Here, we propose an optimization problem
whose solution guarantees better trading conditions for DERs
and loads with respect to the current energy trading paradigm
and, at the same time, enforces the operation of an electrical
optimization technique that is possibly already in place. With
respect to the current energy market, the only regulatory act to
enable the proposed optimized market is to allow direct energy
trading between the grid agents. As noted before, this scenario
is expected to become a solid reality in the near future.
To optimize the electrical status of the power network, we
allow the PCC to influence the amount of energy that the DERs
inject into the grid. In particular, PCC can prevent DERs from
injecting energy by buying it. In this case, the energy bought
by the PCC is for example stored by the DERs into their
batteries, and could be made available for future use.
D. Use Cases
i) In the first use case, we consider the current based sur-
round control (CBSC) proposed in [15]. When this technique
is implemented, the electrical network is divided into clusters.
Each cluster is made of a pair of DERs connected such as
on the path between them there are only loads. Within each
cluster, the DERs cooperate to feed the loads on the path
connecting them. The framework proposed in this paper can
be utilized to enforce CBSC by defining market rules that
guarantee economic advantages for the loads and the DERs.
First, the DERs in each cluster have to solve an electrical
optimization problem. To do that, the DERs collect the amount
of power needed by the loads. Then, they determine the
optimal amount of power that they should inject into the grid to
minimize the distribution losses as described in [15]. Once this
process is complete, the DERs send to the PCC the information
they obtained (i.e., the optimal amount of power that they
should inject and the power needed by the loads) together with
the maximum amount of power they are willing to sell (i.e.,
to inject). The PCC collects this information and, by solving
the optimization problem defined in this paper determines the
prices pi,j and the discounts sj,i of Fig. 2 which guarantee that,
when acting as rational agents, DERs and loads experience
economic benefits while minimizing the grid power losses.
This process can be carried out according to different time
scales (i.e., real time, on a minute basis, or on an hourly
basis), moreover the electrical optimization time scale and
the market one can be decoupled. For example, the electrical
optimization can operate in real time, while the market one
can operate on an hourly basis. In this case, DERs and loads
must send to the PCC hourly generation and consumption
data. This can be done in a day ahead fashion by forecasting
the power generation and consumption of the next hour in
each cluster. This information is then sent to the PCC, who
solves the electrical optimization problem assuming a constant
power consumption and generation during the next hour and
determines the prices pi,j and the discounts sj,i to be applied
accordingly. Once this is done, the electrical optimization is
performed in real time, but the energy trading strategy remain
the same until the next update of market quantities (prices).
ii) The second use case deals with the peak shaving
technique in [26]. This optimization requires that the DERs
send to the PCC a day ahead forecast of the generated power.
Once the PCC receives this information, it performs a day
ahead forecast of the grid power consumption and, based on
these two predictions, it computes two parameters that are
broadcast to the DERs. Once they receive these parameters,
the DERs determine the amount of active and reactive power
that they will inject into the grid. Differently from CBSC, in
this case only the aggregated power consumption from the
loads is required. Nevertheless, the computation of a suitable
trading strategy, through the optimization that we propose
in this paper, requires one to know the power consumption
of each load. According to the growing diffusion of home
deployed smart meters [34], this fine-grained information is
easily gathered and is expected to be available in nearly
all future power grids. With this information, it is possible
to perform the market optimization proposed here. To do
that, the PCC determines the optimal amount of power that
the DERs have to generate to prevent power consumption
peaks. Moreover, it determines the amount of power that the
DERs have to sell to the loads to fulfill their power demand.
For example, consider Fig. 1 and assume that the electrical
optimization process dictates that DERs G1 and G2 inject E1
and E2 power, respectively. Moreover, assume that loads L1
and L2 will need D1 and D2 power, respectively. Then, a
possible power allocation scheme could be:
• min(E1, D1) power is sold by G1 to D1;
• min(E2, D2) power is sold by G2 to D2;
• the remaining available (needed) power is sold to (bought
from) the PCC.
This information is then sent to the DERs and loads, respec-
tively. After that, the PCC solves the optimization problem
presented here, obtaining the prices pi,j and discounts sj,i
of Fig. 2. As in the previous case, different time scales can be
used for the electrical and market optimization processes.
III. NOTATION AND MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION
PROBLEM
In this section, we present the first core contribution of this
paper, which consists in an original optimization modeling of
the multi-agent system. Our goal is to propose an optimized
market model aiming at increasing the DERs monetary rev-
enue and reducing the loads expenses while enforcing the grid
electrical efficiency. Given that these are differing optimization
objectives, a multi-objective optimization problem is proposed.
First, we introduce the mathematical notation that is used
throughout the paper. Next, this problem is posed, character-
ized and transformed into an equivalent convex formulation,
which allows for a convenient computation of the optimal
Pareto frontier.
A. Notation
We now introduce the mathematical notation that is used for
the market model throughout the paper, and the multi-objective
optimization problem.
Let G be the set of active DERs in the grid, |G|= G, G ∈ N,
whereG is the cardinality of G. Let L be the set of active loads
in the grid, |L|= L, L ∈ N, where L is the cardinality of L.
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P = {P ∈ RG×L++ : pi,j ≤ Pi, ∀ i ∈ G} (1)
be the set of matrices P whose elements are the unitary prices
pi,j that the DERs propose to the loads. The i, j element,
for i = 1, . . . , G and j = 1, . . . , L, of matrix P is denoted
by pi,j and represents the unitary price that Gi proposes to
Lj , ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L. Let pi,· and p]·,j denote the i-th
row and the j-th column of P , respectively. Moreover, let
Pi, ∀ i ∈ G be the PCC imposed maximum unitary price that
Gi can propose to the loads.
Let
H = {H ∈ R
G×(L+1)
+ :
L∑
j=0
hi,j = Ei, ∀ i ∈ G} (2)
be the set of matrices H representing the amount of power
that the DERs can sell to each buyer (the loads or the PCC).
The i, j element, for i = 1, . . . , G and j = 1, . . . , L, of matrix
H is denoted by hi,j and represents the amount of power that
Gi sells to the buyer j (where j = 0 denotes the PCC and
j = 1, . . . , L denotes load Lj). With hi,· and h·,j , we denote
the i-th row and the j-th column of H , respectively.
Let
D = {D ∈ R
L×(G+1)
+ :
G∑
j=0
di,j = Di, ∀ i ∈ L} (3)
be the set of matricesD representing the amount of power that
the loads can buy from each seller (the DERs or the PCC).
The i, j element, for i = 1, . . . , L and j = 1, . . . , G, of matrix
D is denoted by di,j and represents the amount of power that
load Li buys from the seller j (where j = 0 denotes the PCC
and j = 1, . . . , G denotes Gj ). With di,· and d·,j , we denote
the i-th row and the j-th column of D, respectively.
We aim at bounding the maximum expense from the PCC
and, to this end, we introduce a further parameter α. Let
S = {S ∈ RL×G+ : si,j ≤ αpj,i, ∀ i ∈ L, ∀ j ∈ G} (4)
be the set of matrices S representing the discounts that the
PCC applies to the unitary prices that the DERs propose
to the loads. We recall that the discount policy is meant to
drive the electrical grid state toward the optimal one, which
is determined by a selected electrical optimization technique.
The i, j element, for i = 1, . . . , L and j = 1, . . . , G, of matrix
S is denoted by si,j and represents the discount that the PCC
is willing to apply to the unitary price pi,j that Gj proposes
to Li. Moreover, let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 be the PCC defined maximum
discount factor, i.e., the PCC is willing to discount at most
(100α)% for each proposed unitary price.
Let H ∈ H, we define the index sets: H˜i,· = {k ∈
{1, . . . , L}, k : hi,k 6= 0} and H˜·,j = {k ∈ {1, . . . , G}, k :
hk,j 6= 0}. These two sets determine the row and column
indices, respectively, of the non zero elements of H .
Similarly, for the demand we define
D˜i,· = {k ∈ {0, . . . , G} : di,k 6= 0}
D˜·,j = {k ∈ {1, . . . , L} : dk,j 6= 0}.
(5)
As above, these two sets respectively determine the row and
column indices of the non zero elements of D.
B. Objective Functions
Each DER will support the proposed market model, as
described in Section II-C, only if it guarantees a higher
monetary revenue with respect to solely selling its energy to
the PCC. We represent the monetary revenue of the DER i
when selling its Ei amount of energy to the loads, as specified
by the vector hi,· and using the unitary prices defined by pi,·,
by the following equation
UGi (pi,·,hi,·) =
L∑
j=1
pi,jhi,j + (Ei −
L∑
j=1
hi,j))γ
PCC
i
(∀ i ∈ G) .
(6)
Note that with the second addend we model the fact that all
the excess energy from DER i that is not sold to the loads,
will be bought by the PCC. This is, in fact, what occurs in
current markets and what we also consider here.
In contrast to the DERs behavior, each load will endorse the
proposed market model only if it guarantees lower expenses
with respect to solely buying energy from the PCC. Using
the demand vector di,· and the discounted unitary prices
p]·,i − si,·, we represent the expense incurred by Li when
buying energy from the DERs as
ULi (p]·,i,di,·, si,·) =
G∑
j=1
(pj,i − si,j)di,j
+ (Di −
G∑
j=1
di,j)pi
PCC
i , (∀ i ∈ L) .
(7)
We assume that an electrical grid optimization strategy is
available and, through it, we obtain the optimal demands
d⋄i,·, ∀ i ∈ L for the loads from an electrical standpoint.
These are optimal in the sense that they will drive the grid
toward a certain desirable electrical state. Any optimization
scheme from the state of the art can be used to obtain these
optimal demands, a possible technique is discussed shortly in
Section IV.
Within our market scenario, the PCC drives the power grid
as close as possible to the optimal working point and, to this
end, it enforces a discount si,j to each unitary price pj,i thatGj
proposes to Li. The effect of the discounts is determined, for
each load Li, by computing the squared distance between the
chosen demand vector di,· and the most electrically efficient
one d⋄i,·. Such distance is computed through the following
equation:
UPCCi (di,·) = ||di,· − d
⋄
i,·||
2
2 (∀ i ∈ L) . (8)
The goal of the PCC is then to determine a discount matrix
S that minimizes the distance in Eq. 8. We recall that each
individual discount si,j is upper bounded by si,j ≤ αpj,i.
C. Constraints
The electrical state of the system induces a set of constraints
to account for the physical consistency of the grid. Moreover,
an additional set of constraints limits the maximum prices
that the DERs can propose to the loads, and the maximum
discounts that can be applied to these prices. Next, these
constraints are presented and discussed.
6We impose that each DER Gi ∈ G sells no more than its
surplus energy Ei, by the following equation
L∑
j=1
hi,j ≤ Ei ∀ i ∈ G . (9)
With this constraint we make sure that Gi can not sell more
energy than the amount remaining after fulfilling its own
needs.
We model the fact that the loads are not equipped with
energy storage devices, and hence each load must buy the
exact amount of energy needed to fulfill its current power
demand. This is implied by the following equation
G∑
j=1
di,j ≤ Di ∀ i ∈ L , (10)
and by the second addend of Eq. (7). The reason for the
inequality in Eq. (10) is because the loads are not required
to buy all the energy they need from the DERs, but they can
also buy part of it from the PCC, which is referred to as
di,0, ∀i ∈ L. It follows that
∑G
j=0 di,j = Di.
Furthermore, the amount of energy that DER Gi ∈ G is
selling to load Lj ∈ L must be equal to the amount of energy
that Lj is buying from Gi, i.e.,
hi,j = dj,i ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L . (11)
The limits imposed by PCC to the prices that the DERs
propose to the loads are modeled by the following constraints
pi,j ≤ Pi ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L , (12)
where the maximum prices act as market regulators, preventing
the prices from growing unboundedly and also determine the
maximum unitary discount that the PCC is willing to apply.
The maximum fraction of the unitary prices proposed by
the DERs that can be discounted by the PCC is set by the
constraint
si,j ≤ αpj,i ∀ i ∈ L, ∀ j ∈ G . (13)
D. Optimization Problem
With the objective functions defined in Eqs. (6)-(8) and
the constraints of Eqs. (9)-(13), the following multi-objective
optimization problem can be formulated:
min
P ,H,D,S

 U
G
i (pi,·,hi,·)
−1 ∀ i ∈ G
ULi (p]·,i,di,·, si,·) ∀ i ∈ L
UPCCi (di,·) ∀ i ∈ L

 (14a)
s.t.
L∑
j=1
hi,j ≤ Ei ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
G∑
j=1
di,j ≤ Di ∀ i ∈ L
pi,j ≤ Pi ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
sj,i ≤ αpi,j ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
hi,j = dj,i ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L .
(14b)
Solving the multi-objective optimization problem (14) does
not lead to a unique solution, because the objective functions in
Eqs. (6)-(8) are contrasting. Hence, simultaneously minimizing
these objective functions leads to a set of solutions called
Pareto Frontier (PF). In this paper, we adopt the Pareto multi-
objective optimality definition [35]. Next, we investigate the
Pareto-optimal (P-optimal) solution, with particular emphasis
on its domain and on the non-convexity of its objective
functions. With D∗, H∗, s∗i,j and p
∗
i,j we mean any solution
of (14) resting on the PF.
Proposition 1: Consider the optimization problem Eq. (14)
and let pj,i(1 − α) > piPCCi for some j ∈ {1, . . . , G} and let
d∗i,· be the i-th row of the P-optimal demand matrix D
∗ ∈ D.
Then d∗i,j = 0 , ∀ si,j ∈ ]0, αpj,i] and the P-optimal discount
value s∗i,j admits infinite solutions.
Proof: Let pj,i(1 − α) > pi
PCC
i and let d
∗
i,· be the P-
optimal demand vector for load i. If d∗i,j 6= 0, then a new
vector d¯i,· such that d¯i,j = 0 and d¯i,0 = d
∗
i,0 + d
∗
i,j can be
defined. It holds by construction that ULi (p]·,i, d¯i,·, si,·) <
ULi (p]·,i,d
∗
i,·, si,·), but this is not possible because d
∗
i,· is P-
optimal and hence d∗i,j = 0.
According to Proposition 1, if the price that Gj proposes to
Li is still higher than the PCC imposed price, when applying
the maximum discount factor α, then no feasible discount can
make Lj buy power from Gi.
Proposition 2: Consider optimization problem (14) and let
pi,j < γ
PCC
i for some j ∈ {1, . . . , L}, and let h
∗
i,· be the
i-th row of the P-optimal allocation matrix H∗ ∈ H. Then
h∗i,j = 0 and the P-optimal discount value s
∗
j,i admits infinite
solutions.
Proof: Let pi,j < γ
PCC
i and let h
∗
i,· be the P-optimal
allocation vector for DG i. If h∗i,j 6= 0, then a new allocation
vector h¯i,· such that h¯i,j = 0 and h¯i,0 = h
∗
i,0 + h
∗
i,j can
be defined. It is true, by construction, that UGi (pi,·, h¯i,·) >
UGi (pi,·,h
∗
i,·), but this is not possible because h
∗
i,· is P-optimal
and hence h∗i,j = 0.
Proposition 2 states that if the revenue that Gi obtains by
selling its power to the PCC is greater than the maximum
revenue that can be obtained by selling it to Lj , then again
there is no way for the PCC to enforce the electrical grid
efficiency. To summarize, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that,
in order for the PCC to enforce the grid electrical efficiency
through a discount policy, the following conditions must hold
∀ i ∈ G, j ∈ L:
pi,j ≥ γ
PCC
i and pi,j(1− α) ≤ pi
PCC
j (15)
We recall that, as discussed in Section II-C, the PCC is not
allowed to act on γPCCi and pi
PCC
i as they depend on preexisting
contract terms and conditions. Hence, the only way it can act
to promote the electrical efficiency of the grid is to allow
the DERs to have a higher revenue through selling energy
to a specific load, dictated by the joint optimization that is
proposed here, as opposed to selling it to any other loads or
to the PCC itself. To do this, the PCC discounts the prices
that DERs propose. However, to limit its expenses the PCC
imposes a maximum discount factor (i.e., α) that dictates the
limit to within the DERs proposed prices can grow before the
loads (being rational agents) stop buying energy from them,
i.e., when the price paid to buy energy from a DER is higher
than buying it from the PCC (pi,j(1− α) > piPCCj ).
Proposition 3: Consider optimization problem (14) and let
h∗i,j , d
∗
j,i respectively be the P-optimal i, j allocation and j, i
7demand values (according to the respective indexing). Then,
either one of the following holds:
1) h∗i,j = d
∗
j,i = 0 if pi,j(1− α) > pi
PCC
j or pi,j < γ
PCC
i ;
2) h∗i,j = d
∗
j,i 6= 0 otherwise .
Proof: By considering Propositions 1 and 2, and recalling
that both the DERs and the loads are rational agents, we see
that the only case where it is economically convenient for Gi
to sell power to Lj is when it can get a higher revenue than
the one it would obtain selling the same amount of power to
the PCC. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 3 follows from Propositions 1 and 2. It states that
the PCC can enforce the grid efficiency only if the conditions
of Eq. (15) are met. Moreover, if these conditions are met, the
rational behavior for DERs and loads will be to adhere to the
discount policy proposed by the PCC and trading energy with
the agents guaranteeing higher revenues and smaller expenses
for the DERs and loads, respectively.
Proposition 4: Consider the optimization problem Eq. (14)
and let p∗i,j be the P-optimal i, j price value for the optimiza-
tion problem. Let h∗i,j = d
∗
j,i 6= 0. Then, it must hold that
1) piPCCj < p
∗
i,j − sj,i for at least one value of sj,i ;
2) p∗i,j > γ
PCC
i .
Proof: By considering Propositions 1-3 and recalling that
loads are rational agents, we see that the only case where Lj
will buy power fromGi is when the discounted price proposed
by Gi is lower than the price it would pay to the PCC.
Moreover, by recalling that DERs are also rational agents, we
see that the only case in which Gi will sell power to Lj is the
one where its revenue is higher than the one it can get from
the PCC. This concludes the proof.
Proposition 4 descends from Proposition 3. It states that, in
order for the DERs and loads to adhere to the proposed model,
the discounts (limited to a fraction α of the proposed prices)
must meet the rational behavior of the trading agents.
Propositions 1-4 characterize the PF of problem (14). From
these propositions, it follows that, by construction, no solu-
tion on the PF can lead to situations where 1) some DERs
experience smaller revenues with respect to the case where all
the energy is sold to the PCC or 2) some loads experience
higher expenses with respect to the case where all the energy
is bought from the PCC. Hence, network agents deciding to
adopt the proposed optimized market model have no reason
not to accept the trading strategy resulting from the solution
of the optimization problem (14).
In the following proposition, we show that the domains
defined through Eqs. (1)-(4) are convex.
Proposition 5: The sets defined in Eqs. (1)-(4) are convex
with respect to the matrix sum operation.
Proof: Let P1,P2 ∈ P and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. Let P3 =
θP1 + (1− θ)P2, then
L∑
j=1
p3i,j = θ
L∑
j=1
p1i,j + (1 − θ)
L∑
j=1
p2i,j . (16)
Since P1,P2 ∈ P , it holds true that
∀ i ∈ G,
L∑
j=1
p1i,j ≤ Pi and
L∑
j=1
p2i,j ≤ Pi (17)
hence
L∑
j=1
p3i,j ≤ θPi + (1− θ)Pi = Pi, ∀ i ∈ G , (18)
thus P3 ∈ P .
The convexity of sets H, D and S can be shown by similar
arguments.
Next, we show that although the domains are convex the
multi-objective optimization problem of Eq. (14) is not.
Proposition 6: Optimization problem (14) is not convex.
Proof: In order to prove the non convexity of Eq. (14)
it is sufficient to show that one of its objective functions is
not convex. Considering UGi (pi,·,hi,·), since U
G
i (pi,·,hi,·)
is twice differentiable in its domain the Hessian matrix
ΦUG
i
(pi,·,hi,·)
can be computed:
ΦUG
i
(pi,·,hi,·)
=
[
A B
B A
]
, (19)
where A ∈ {0}L×L and B is the L × L identity matrix.
ΦUG
i
(pi,·,hi,·)
is a permutation matrix. Let z ∈ R2L and let
z1, z2 ∈ RL : zT = [zT1 z
T
2 ], then
zTΦUG
i
(pi,·,hi,·)
z = [zT2 z
T
1 ]z , (20)
and hence ΦUG
i
(pi,·,hi,·)
is not positive semidefinite nor it is
negative semidefinite.
According to Proposition 6, solving problem (14) with stan-
dard convex multi-objective solution methods could not lead
to the actual PF. In the following subsection, a transformation
of problem (14) is proposed, which establishes an equivalent
convex optimization problem whose solutions are the same
as those of problem (14). The convexity of the new problem
allows the application of standard solution methods.
E. Geometric Programming Formulation
Since the DERs’ and loads’ objective functions can be
expressed in posynomial form, part of the non-convex multi-
objective minimization problem (14) can be formulated as a
geometric programming problem [36]–[38]. Next, the steps
leading to this transformation will be presented and discussed.
First, we can express Eq. (6) in the form
UGi (pi,·,hi,·) =
L∑
j=1
pi,jhi,j + hi,0γ
PCC
i ∀ i ∈ G . (21)
Now, we consider the following definitions:
αGj =
{
0 if j = 0
1 otherwise
, cGij =
{
γPCCi if j = 0
1 otherwise
(22)
and let pi,0 ∈ R ∀ i ∈ G. Then, Eq. (21) can be rewritten as a
posynomial function:
UGi (pi,·,hi,·) =
L∑
j=0
cGijpi,j
αGj hi,j , ∀ i ∈ G . (23)
Similarly, Eq. (7) can be re-formulated as
ULi (p]·,i,di,·, si,·) =
G∑
j=1
(pj,i − si,j)di,j + di,0pi
PCC
i , (24)
8∀ i ∈ L. If we define
αLj =
{
0 if j = 0
1 otherwise
and cLij =
{
piPCCi if j = 0
1 otherwise ,
(25)
Eq. (24) can also be formulated as a posynomial function:
ULi (p
′
·,i,di,·, si,·) =
G∑
j=0
cLijp
′
j,i
αLj di,j , ∀ i ∈ L . (26)
If we apply the geometric programming transformation
detailed in [37], Eq. (23) and Eq. (26) can be transformed
into convex functions:
U ′i
G
(pi,·,hi,·) =
∑
j∈H˜i,·
eα
G
j log pi,j+log hi,j+log c
G
ij , (27)
U ′i
L
(p′·,i,di,·, si,·) =
∑
j∈D˜i,·
eα
L
j log p
′
j,i+log di,j+log c
L
ij . (28)
Based on Eqs. (27) and (28), the non-convex multi-objective
optimization problem (14) can be transformed into a convex
multi-objective optimization problem:
min
P ,H,D,S


− log
(
U ′i
G
(pi,·,hi,·)
)
∀ i ∈ G
log
(
U ′i
L
(p′·,i,di,·, si,·)
)
∀ i ∈ L
UPCCi (di,·) ∀ i ∈ L

 (29a)
s.t.
constraints in Eq. (14b)
p′j,i = pj,i − si,j ∀ i ∈ L, ∀ j ∈ G .
(29b)
Note that this optimization problem is equivalent to (14) in the
sense that the P-optimal solutions of problem (29) are identical
to those of problem (14).
F. Solution
Given the convexity of optimization problem (29), whose
solutions are identical to (14), its solution can be obtained
through standard convex solvers. Since problem (29) is convex,
the duality gap is zero and the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
optimality conditions can be applied to the scalarized form
of problem (26). To do so, let λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λG+2L]
T ∈
[0, 1]G+2L :
∑G+2L
i=1 λi = 1, then the scalarized objective
function is
U(P ,H ,D,S) = −
G∑
i=1
λi log
(
U ′i
G
(pi,·,hi,·)
)
+
L∑
i=1
λi+G log
(
U ′i
L
(p′·,i,di,·, si,·)
)
+
L∑
i=1
λi+G+LU
PCC
i (di,·) .
(30)
Then, the scalarized convex minimization problem can be
defined
min
P ,H,D,S
U(P ,H ,D,S) (31a)
s.t.
L∑
j=1
hi,j ≤ Ei ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
G∑
j=1
di,j ≤ Di ∀ i ∈ L
pi,j ≤ Pi ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
sj,i ≤ αpi,j ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
hi,j = dji ∀ i ∈ G, ∀ j ∈ L
p′j,i = pj,i − si,j ∀ i ∈ L, ∀ j ∈ G .
(31b)
Eq. (31) is a standard convex minimization problem, hence,
if the problem is feasible, a P-optimal solution is guaranteed
to exist ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]G+2L :
∑G+2L
i=1 λi = 1. The Pareto
frontier is the set of all the P-optimal solutions to problem
(31) obtained for every possible weight vector λ. We recall that
all the points in the Pareto frontier are equally P-optimal (in the
sense that all these solutions yield the same value of the scalar-
ized objective function), it is up to the decision maker (i.e.,
the PCC) to determine the particular weight vector satisfying
her/his own needs. In the following results, λ was heuristically
chosen to guarantee that the best electrical working point is
reached for low values of the discount factor α. The rationale is
to drive the grid toward the wanted electrical operating point
by maintaining the expenses incurred by the PCC low. As
discussed in Section III-D, all the solutions of problem (31)
lying on the PF guarantee economic benefits to all the DERs
and the loads participating in the proposed market. Hence,
regardless of the specific λ that is selected, all the network
agents will benefit from embracing the corresponding P-
optimal solution. The choice of λ determines the entity of
the benefit that each individual agent will achieve thanks to
the optimization process. In the proposed model, it is the
PCC that selects, during each optimization phase, the most
suitable λ with respect to each specific scenario. For example,
in certain scenarios it might be appropriate to specifically
enforce the electrical optimization in some regions of the
grid. In such a case, the components of λ associated with
agents connected to these particular regions will be higher
than the others. By doing so, minimizing these functions will
have a greater impact on the overall minimization with respect
to the functions of agents in other portions of the grid. We
remark that the choice of the vector λ determines the particular
solution on the PF, but it is not part of the optimization
process.
G. Distributed Solution
Here, we present a decentralized solution of problem
(31) exploiting the alternating direction method of multipli-
ers (ADMM) [36]. Consider the function U ′i
G
(pi,·,hi,·) of
Eq. (27), and, for the ease of notation, define
yi,j = e
αGj log pi,j+log hi,j+log c
G
ij ∀j ∈ H˜i,·. (32)
Then, Eq. (27) can be rewritten as
U ′i
G
(pi,·,hi,·) =
∑
j∈H˜i,·
yi,j = U
′G
i (yi,·) , (33)
9and, for the Jensen’s inequality:
log
(
1
|H˜i,·|
U ′
G
i (yi,·)
)
≥
1
|H˜i,·|
∑
j∈H˜i,·
log (yi,j) , (34)
∀i ∈ G.
Proposition 7: The feasible vector
y∗i,· = argmax
yi,·

 ∑
j∈H˜i,·
log (yi,j)

 , (35)
subject to the constraints of problem (29), is unique and
maximizes U ′
G
i (yi,·).
Proof: Since the logarithm is a strictly concave function,
the sum of logarithms is strictly concave. Hence, y∗i,· is unique.
Since y∗i,· is unique, it follows that ∀ feasible yi,· 6= y
∗
i,· yi,j ≤
y∗i,j∀j ∈ H˜i,·. Then,
∀ feasible yi,· 6= y
∗
i,·
∑
j∈H˜i,·
yi,j ≤
∑
j∈H˜i,·
y∗i,j . (36)
This concludes the proof.
As a consequence of Proposition 7, the feasible solution that
maximizes the right-hand side of Eq. (34), also maximizes the
original objective function log
(
U ′
G
i (yi,·)
)
. Define
U˙Gi (yi,·) =
∑
j∈H˜i,·
log (yi,j) , ∀i ∈ G . (37)
Similarly, define
U˙Li (zi,·) =
∑
j∈D˜i,·
log (zi,j) , ∀i ∈ L , (38)
where zi,j = e
αLj log p
′
j,i+log di,j+log c
L
ij . For the same argument
of Proposition 7, the vector that minimizes U˙Li (zi,·) is unique
and also minimizes log
(
U ′
L
i (yi,·)
)
. By substituting U ′
G
i (yi,·)
and U ′
L
i (zi,·) with U˙
G
i (yi,·) and U˙
L
i (zi,·), respectively, in
Eq. (30), the objective function of problem (31) becomes
separable with respect to the interactions between any pair
of network agents. In the following, we show how to exploit
this separability to express problem (31) as a general form
consensus with regularization [29]. Consider a smart grid with
K > 0 branches departing from the PCC. Define region Rk
as the set of grid agents (i.e., loads and DERs) connected to
the PCC through the k-th branch. Then, the DER set G can
be partitioned into K subsets GRk , k = 1, . . . ,K such that
GR1 ∪ . . .∪GRK = G, and GR1 ∩ . . .∩GRK = ∅ where the set
GRk is the set of DERs belonging to region k. Likewise, the set
of loads L can be partitioned into K subsets LR1 , . . . ,LRK .
According to these partitions, and assuming that g ∈ GRk and
l ∈ LRk , U˙Gg (yg,·) and U˙
L
l (zl,·) can be rewritten as:
U˙Gg (yg,·) =
∑
j∈H˜g,·∩GRk
log (yg,j) +
∑
j∈H˜g,·∩(G\GRk )
log (yg,j) , (39)
and
U˙Ll (zl,·) =
∑
j∈D˜l,·∩L
Rk
log (zl,j) +
∑
j∈D˜l,·∩(L\L
Rk )
log (zl,j) , (40)
respectively. For the ease of notation, Eq. (39) can be rewritten
as
U˙Gg (yg,·) = U˙
GRk
g (y
k
g,·) + U˙
G\GRk
g (y
k˘
g,·) , (41)
where the first term in the RHS corresponds to the first sum
in the RHS of Eq. (39), and the second term corresponds to
the second sum in the RHS of Eq. (39), where ykg,· models
interactions between g ∈ GRk and agents in the same region
Rk, while y
k˘
g,· models interactions across regions. The same
decomposition can be applied to loads (L) and the PCC,
leading to:
U˙Ll (zl,·) = U˙
Lk
l (z
k
l,·) + U˙
L\Lk
l (z
k˘
l,·) ,
UPCCl (dl,·) = U
PCC
l (d
k
l,·) + U
PCC
l (d
k˘
l,·) .
(42)
The separability of all the objective functions allows defining
a scalarized optimization problem whose solution is equivalent
to the one of problem (31). This can be done by defining the
new scalarized objective function as
U˙(P ,H ,D,S) =
K∑
k=1

 ∑
i∈GRk
λiU˙
GRk
i (y
k
i,·)+
∑
i∈LRk
(
λi+GU˙
Lk
l (z
k
i,·) + λi+2GU
PCC
l (d
k
i,·)

+
K∑
k=1
(∑
i∈G
λiU˙
G\GRk
i (y
k˘
i,·)+
∑
i∈LRk
(
λi+GU˙
L\Lk
i (z
k˘
i,·) + λi+2GU
PCC
i (d
k˘
i,·)

 ,
(43)
which can be rewritten in compact form as:
U˙(P ,H ,D,S) =
K∑
i=1
U˙Rk(V k) + U˙ cross(W ) , (44)
where V k is a vector containing the portions of P , H , D, S
pertaining only agents in region Rk, U˙
cross(W ) contains the
cross-terms modeling the interactions across regions, while
W = (P , H , D, S). For construction, V k is independent of
any other V r : r 6= k. Replacing Eq. (30) with Eq. (44) into
problem (31) and adding the constraints that guarantee that
each V k is consistent with W , generates a new problem that
is equivalent to the previous one but is posed as a general form
consensus with regularization. This problem can be efficiently
solved in a decentralized fashion using ADMM, as shown
in [29], [39]. We recall that, since the new considered problem
is convex, ADMM is guaranteed to converge to the unique
P-optimal solution (for each given λ). Hence, the trading
strategies that are obtained through this decentralized approach
are the same as those obtained through the centralized one.
In the following section, we present numerical results to
characterize the P-optimal solutions of our original multi-
objective optimization problem (14) based on the established
equivalent scalarized problem (31).
IV. SIMULATION SETUP
In this section, we present the electrical grid topology and
the electrical scenarios, in terms of power demand at the loads
and surplus energy at the DERs, that will be considered for
our subsequent performance analysis of Section V.
We consider the electrical grid of Fig. 1 as a case study. To
determine the optimal power demand matrix, i.e., d⋄i,·, ∀ i ∈ L,
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we selected the Current Based Surround Control algorithm
(CBSC) [15]. The reason why the CBSC algorithm has been
chosen is twofold. On the one hand, it drives the grid toward
its theoretically optimal working point, and hence it allows
the assessment of the optimization process ability to drive
the power grid toward its maximum electrical efficiency. On
the other hand, the communication infrastructure requirements
needed to implement CBSC are the same needed to implement
the proposed optimization strategy. Both techniques, indeed,
require that each node is equipped with a smart metering de-
vice (to determine the exact power availability, power demand
and line impedance) and a transceiver (to communicate the
measured data and implement control actions). Lastly, CBSC
was proven to be very efficient and to lead to optimal results in
terms of power loss minimization along the distribution lines.
Still, we also recall that other optimization techniques can be
used in combination with our optimization framework.
CBSC groups the nodes into clusters. Clusters are defined
by checking, for any pair of DERs, whether their connecting
path includes any other DER or the PCC. If this is not the
case, a cluster is defined as the set containing the two DERs,
the associated nodes, and all the nodes between them in the
electrical network topology. For each cluster, the DER that
is closest to the PCC is elected as the cluster head (CH).
In the case when one of the two DERs in the cluster is
the PCC, this is elected as the CH (i.e., we assume that the
PCC has better communication and computational resources
with respect to the other nodes). The current injected for
optimization purposes is scaled by a real factor 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1.
If we refer to IC as the total current demand in the cluster,
the currents injected by the two DESs therein are ξIC and
(1 − ξ)IC . The parameter ξ is determined for each cluster
according to the instantaneous power demand from its loads
and their branch impedances. Hence, this technique requires
that every node is a smart node (i.e., equipped with metering,
communication and control capabilities).
According to CBSC, the optimal power allocation matrix,
for the considered grid topology, is
D⋄ =

 B2 D1B1 +B2 0
0 D2

 , (45)
where with Bi, i = 1, . . . , 4 we indicate the length of the
distribution lines, see table Tab. I, whereas D1 and D2 are
the power demands associated with the two loads L1 and L2,
which have been set to D1 = D2 = 100 kW. According to
Eq. (45) and Tab. I, the optimal power demand matrix is:
D⋄ =
[
50kW 0
0 100kW
]
. (46)
Given the optimal power demand matrix of Eq. (45), three
electrical scenarios have been considered: 1) the first scenario
is referred to as tight power offer as it addresses the case where
the individual surplus energy for each DER equals the total
energy that it should inject according to CBSC. 2) The second
scenario is referred to as unbalanced tight power offer. Here,
the total surplus energy equals the optimal one that should
be injected, but the individual surplus energy does not match
that dictated by CBSC. In this case, the optimal electrical grid
conditions can not be reached. 3) The third is referred to as
TABLE I: Distribution lines length in meters
B1 B2 B3 B4
50 m 50 m 45 m 90 m
TABLE II: DERs surplus energy (Ei)
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
G1 50kW 60kW 100kW
G2 100kW 90kW 100kW
loose power offer. This scenario considers the case where the
total surplus energy exceeds the total energy demand.
The DERs surplus energy for each considered scenario is
shown in Tab. II.
V. RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the P-optimal solutions obtained
through the proposed optimization approach to the case study
of Section IV.
For each scenario, the performance of the optimization
process has been assessed using the following metrics:
• the DERs gain, obtained as
gain =
revenueopt − revenueno
revenueno
× 100 ,
where “revenueopt” is the aggregated revenue of DERs
when our joint optimization is used, whereas “revenueno”
corresponds to the DERs aggregated revenues in the
non-optimized case, i.e., where the surplus power is
entirely sold to the PCC;
• the loads gain, obtained as
gain =
expenseno − expenseopt
expenseno
× 100 ,
where “expenseopt” is the aggregated expense of loads
when our joint optimization is used, whereas “expenseno”
corresponds to the loads aggregated expense in the
non-optimized case, i.e., where the needed power is
entirely bought from the PCC;
• the achieved electrical efficiency with respect to the
theoretical optimal working point, achieved by CBSC.
Moreover, we set γPCCi = 20, ∀i ∈ G and pi
PCC
i = 50, ∀i ∈
L. This models the real-world scenario where the PCC buys
energy for less than what it sells it for. Given these values,
the prices pi,j can range from 50 to 50(1 + α). To select one
particular solution on the PF we chose a specific vector λ.
This vector has the following properties:
• functions of the same class have the same weight, i.e.,
λ1 = λ2 (for the DERs), λ3 = λ4 (for the loads), and
λ5 = λ6 (for the PCC);
• λ1 = 0.3λ3;
• λ1 = 0.1λ5.
By doing so, we give the higher weight to the functions
enforcing the electrical efficiency, while the revenue of the
DERs becomes less important in the global optimization
process. Next, we discuss the performance for the three
scenarios identified in Section IV.
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Fig. 3: Aggregated gains for revenues (DERs) and expenses
(loads). Tight power offer case.
A. Scenario 1: Tight Power Offer
In the tight power offer scenario, G1 and G2 sell the exact
amount of power dictated by the PCC.
Fig. 3 shows the DERs and the loads aggregate gains (with
respect to the case in which no optimization is performed)
obtained through the proposed optimization method, i.e., solv-
ing (14) for a discount factor α ranging from 10% to 90%.
We recall that α is used as a free parameter to bound the
maximum expense from the PCC, according to the proposed
discount strategy. A first noticeable result is that, for every
value of α, the optimized aggregate revenue is always larger
than that in the non-optimized case. Moreover, the aggregate
expense is always smaller than in the non-optimized one.
These facts are highly desirable, since they guarantee that
endorsing the proposed market model leads to a substantial
economic convenience for all the agents involved in the energy
trading process.
When computing the distance from the electrically efficient
condition, the norm of of the difference di,·−d⋄i,· is computed
for each load i ∈ L. The plotted distance is thus the sum
of the L individual distances. Fig. 4 shows this distance for
α = 10%, . . . , 90%. We emphasize that, as the maximum
discount factor reaches 21%, the electrical efficiency obtained
through the proposed optimization equals the theoretical opti-
mal electrical efficiency obtained through CBSC.
Remarkably, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show that for a maximum
discount factor of 21%, the P-optimal solution reaches the
maximum achievable electrical efficiency, while doubling the
aggregate revenue of DERs with respect to the non-optimized
case. At the same time, the consumers will incur sensibly
smaller expenses.
B. Scenario 2: Unbalanced Tight Power Offer
In the unbalanced tight power offer scenario, G1 is willing
to sell more power than the amount dictated by CBSC, while
G2 sells less power than what dictated by CBSC.
Fig. 5 shows the DERs and the loads aggregate gains
obtained through the proposed optimization when the maxi-
mum discount factor α varies from 10% to 90%. As in the
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Fig. 4: Electrical efficiency in terms of distance from optimal
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Fig. 5: Aggregated gains for revenues (DERs) and expenses
(loads). Unbalanced tight power offer case.
previous case, endorsing the proposed optimization will lead
to economical benefits for both the DERs and the loads.
Fig. 6 shows the distance between the power demand matrix
obtained through the proposed optimization and the optimal
one obtained through CBSC. The considered scenario does not
allow to reach the theoretical optimal electrical efficiency. As
a matter of fact, even though the total available power equals
that required by CBSC, G1 has more available power than
what is needed, while G2 has less. Hence, no configuration
exists for which the power allocation matrix obtained through
the proposed optimization approach can match the optimal
power demand matrix. It can nevertheless be noted that, for
a maximum discount factor of α = 20%, the optimization
process reaches the minimum achievable distance from the
theoretical optimal working point. In contrast with the previous
case, in this scenario there exists, for the selected weight
vector λ, a single maximum discount factor that allows to
maximize the electrical grid efficiency (i.e., the one leading
to the minimum in Fig. 6). In fact, configurations exist where
DERs and loads individual interests drive the grid toward a
non-optimal power allocation condition, i.e., G1, instead of
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(loads). Loose power offer case.
selling 10 kW to the PCC, it starts trading with L2 leading to
a sub-optimal electrical efficiency.
As for the previous case, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that
the proposed optimization always ensures economical benefits
for DERs and loads while, at the same time, leading to an
increased electrical grid efficiency.
C. Scenario 3: Loose Power Offer
In the loose power offer scenario, G1 sells more power than
what dictated by CBSC, while G2 sells the exact amount of
power dictated by the CBSC algorithm.
Fig. 7 shows the performance of the proposed optimization
in terms of the aggregated gains obtained by the DERs and
the loads. As for the previous cases, we see that the proposed
optimization always guarantees higher revenues and smaller
expenses with respect to the case where the PCC is the only
agent trading electrical power, i.e., all power has to be uniquely
sold to or bough from the PCC.
Fig. 8 shows that for α = 20% the optimal electrical
working point is reached. In this case, G1 sells 50 kW to
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electrical condition. Loose money case.
L1 and the remaining available power is sold to the PCC. As
α grows, G1 starts selling more power to L1 and hence the
distance from the optimal electrical condition starts increasing.
As for the previous case, for the selected weight vector λ, a
single value of α exists for which the electrical efficiency is
maximized, i.e., the distribution power losses are minimized.
The presented results show that, for every considered power
configuration, the proposed optimization approach results in
substantial economical benefits (even though the objective
functions of the DERs were given the smallest weight in
the global optimization process) and is likely to drive the
power grid toward its maximum electrical efficiency. It is
worth noting that, in the considered examples, the discount
factor that is required to reach the electrical grid efficiency is
never higher than 21%. This is appealing as it shows that the
maximum discount remains rather small, irrespective of the
network configuration. This may be especially convenient for
the grid operator in practical scenarios.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, an original market model for smart grids
was presented. The proposed framework jointly accounts for
end users economical benefits and electrical grid efficiency
maximization. This model was formally described as a non
convex multi-objective optimization problem, which was then
transformed into a convex one through a bijective transforma-
tion based on geometric programming. Pareto-optimal trading
and discount policies were devised through the solution of
the equivalent convex formulation. Both a centralized and
decentralized solution have been devised. The performance
of the proposed market model was then assessed in terms
of electrical efficiency for the power grid and achievable
economical benefit for all involved actors, i.e., profit made
by DERs and expense incurred by the loads. Several network
configurations were considered so as to systematically test the
efficacy of the proposed market model. Numerical results show
that considerable economical benefits can be reached for all
agents and that the micro grid can be concurrently driven
13
toward an optimal working point through the use of small
discount factors from the regulating authority.
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